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WTO RECOURSE FOR RECLAMATION IRRIGATION 
SUBSIDIES: UNDERMARKET WATER PRICES AS FOREGONE 
REVENUE 
Paul Stanton Kibel* 
There are competing demands for fresh water. Farms look to it as an 
irrigation source, cities rely on it for drinking water, and fisheries (and 
fishermen) depend on it for instream flow. When the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) subsidizes the costs of 
providing fresh water for irrigation in agricultural production, such 
subsidization can result in tiered water pricing. With tiered pricing, 
farms pay the government less per unit than other water users. This 
tiered pricing can distort the water marketplace in a manner that 
encourages wasteful irrigation practices and leaves insufficient water 
instream for fisheries. The dispute over Reclamation irrigation subsidies 
may now be moving from the domestic to the international arena. The 
1994 World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (“WTO Subsidies Agreement”) provides that 
one WTO member country may impose countervailing measures against 
another WTO member country that makes a “financial contribution” 
that is specific to “certain enterprises.”1 The WTO Subsidies Agreement 
further provides that “government revenue . . . otherwise due [that] is 
forgone” can qualify as a “financial contribution” and that governments 
must be paid “adequate remuneration” for goods provided.2 This article 
assesses the potential applicability of the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s 
foregone revenue and adequate remuneration provisions to Reclamation 
irrigation subsidies, with an initial focus on such applicability to 
Reclamation’s Central Valley Project (“CVP”) in California. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
* Professor, Golden Gate University (“GGU”) School of Law, San Francisco, California, and 
Co-Director, GGU Center on Urban Environmental Law (“CUEL”). LL.M., Boalt Hall Law 
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papers the author delivered at the World Water Congress in Recife, Brazil (September 2011) and 
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1 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures arts. 1, 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies]. 
2 Agreement on Subsidies arts. 1.1, 14. 
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I. SUBSIDIZED FARM IRRIGATION—FULL COST AND REAL PRICE 
In the arid west of the United States in the early 1900s, the chief 
constraint on agriculture was the scarcity of freshwater resources.3 In 
                                                                                                             
3 ROBERT DE ROOS, THE THIRSTY LAND: THE STORY OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT 3 
(1948) (“But the tough, basic, all-important problem is water. California is a semiarid state. 
Without water it is not much. Water is its life force. Water is the limiting factor in the growth of 
its great cities and in the productivity of its land . . . . California’s great struggle in its fight for 
growth and prosperity is to find ways to use every drop of the available water, to allow none to go 
waste.”); see also The Bureau of Reclamation: A Very Brief History, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov/history/borhist.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter The 
Bureau of Reclamation]. 
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many areas of the western United States, rainfall is inadequate for dry 
farming.4 In recognition that the creation of large scale works for the 
storage and delivery of water was necessary to put more of the lands of 
the arid west into agricultural production, Congress enacted the 
Reclamation Act in 1902.5 The 1902 Reclamation Act created the 
United States Reclamation Service, which was renamed the United 
States Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) in 1923.6 
The portfolio of Reclamation irrigation projects in the arid west is 
extensive. The portfolio includes: the Rio Grande Project in New 
Mexico (comprising Caballo Dam, Elephant Butte Dam, Percha 
Diversion Dam, Leasburg Diversion Dam, Mesilla Diversion Dam, 
American Diversion Dam and Riverside Diversion Dam);7 the Salt 
River Project in Arizona (comprising Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Horse 
Mesa Dam, Mormom Flat Dam, Stewart Mountain Dam, Bartlett Dam 
and Hoseshoe Dam);8 the Boulder Canyon Project in Arizona and 
Nevada (comprising Hoover Dam);9 the Newlands Project in Nevada 
(comprising Lake Tahoe Dam, Lahontan Dam, Carson River Diversion 
Dam and the Derby Diversion Dam);10 the Parker-Davis Project in 
California (comprising Parker Dam and Davis Dam);11 and the Central 
Valley Project in California (comprising Shasta Dam, Friant Dam, 
Folsom Dam, Contra Loma Dam, Martinez Dam, Franchi Dam and San 
Luis Dam).12 
Of these projects, the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) in California is 
the largest irrigation water supply project constructed and operated by 
Reclamation.13 Construction of the CVP began in the late 1930s,14 but 
                                                                                                             
4 The Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 3. 
5 Id.; Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388. 
6 The Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 3. 
7 Rio Grande Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.js 
p?proj_Name=Rio+Grande+Project (last updated May 16, 2011). 
8 Salt River Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.js 
p?proj_Name=Salt+River+Project (last updated Aug. 19, 2011). 
9 Boulder Canyon Project-Hoover Dam, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov 
/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Boulder+Canyon+Project+-+Hoover+Dam (last updated Feb. 1, 
2012). 
10 Newlands Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.js 
p?proj_Name=Newlands+Project (last updated May 11, 2011). 
11 Parker-Davis Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project. 
jsp?proj_Name=Parker-Davis%20Project (last updated May 11, 2011). 
12 Central Valley Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.usbr.gov/projects/Projec 
t.jsp?proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project (last updated Mar. 15, 2013). 
13 CHRIS EDWARDS & PETER J. HILL, CUTTING THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND 
REFORMING WATER MARKETS 5 (2012), available at http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/ 
sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/pdf/interior-cutting-bureau-reclamation.pdf. 
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the project has grown to include twenty dams with a combined storage 
capacity of approximately eleven million acre feet (“AF”) and 
approximately 500 miles of canals and aqueducts.15 Although a small 
percentage of CVP water is delivered to municipal water agencies, the 
vast majority of CVP water is delivered to contractors for agricultural 
irrigation.16 Most of the CVP irrigation water is provided to large-scale 
agricultural operations in the San Joaquin Valley in particular and to a 
lesser extent in the Sacramento Valley.17 Collectively, the San Joaquin 
Valley and the Sacramento Valley comprise what is commonly referred 
to as California’s Central Valley, which stretches vertically from the 
city of Bakersfield in the south to the city of Redding in the north. 
In addition to agricultural and municipal uses, some CVP water is 
also left instream to provide habitat to sustain salmon, steelhead trout 
and smelt.18 This instream use is sometimes accomplished through 
purchases from Reclamation of CVP water via the Environmental Water 
Account (“EWA”), a governmental entity established in the 1990s to 
help restore declining fisheries.19 
Reclamation establishes the price for delivery of CVP irrigation 
water through long-term water delivery contracts. The contract prices 
set by Reclamation for delivery of irrigation water have been and 
remain well below the prices necessary for Reclamation to recoup its 
initial construction costs or cover ongoing operation and maintenance 
(“O&M”) costs.20 Moreover, the price paid by Central Valley farmers 
for CVP water is much less than the price paid by California cities for 
CVP water, and much less than the price paid by the EWA for CVP 
water to remain instream.21 The CVP’s tiered pricing has enabled 
California farms to maintain a secure supply of inexpensive irrigation 
from the federal government, which has facilitated the planting of such 
                                                                                                             
14 Eric A. Stene, The Central Valley Project, Introduction, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
http://www.usbr.gov/history/cvpintro.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
15 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, OVERVIEW ON CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT FINANCING, COST 
ALLOCATION, AND REPAYMENT ISSUES 4 (2008), available at http://deltavision.ca.gov/Consulta 
ntReports/CVP_Financing_and_Repayment_Summary_9-18-08.pdf. 
16 Id. at 16. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 4; PAT BRANDES & JIM WHITE, ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT EXPENDITURES 
FOR CHINOOK SALMON IN WATER YEAR 2005 (2005), available at http://www.science.calwater. 
ca.gov/pdf/ewa/EWA_Brandes_Salmon_Actions_113005.pdf. 
19 California Water Subsidies: Findings, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Dec. 15, 2004), 
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water intensive crops as alfalfa and cotton in the Central Valley and has 
also provided incentives to grow crops on lands that are only marginally 
suited for farming due to poor drainage conditions.22 
Reclamation’s undermarket irrigation pricing in general, and CVP 
subsidization of irrigation for Central Valley farms in particular, has 
been the subject of domestic criticism in the United States (and attempts 
at domestic reform) for several decades.23 Some of this domestic 
criticism has come from free market advocacy groups generally 
associated with the political right.24 For instance, in 2012, the 
conservative Cato Institute released a paper titled Cutting the Bureau of 
Reclamation and Reforming Water Markets, which noted: 
The CVP is Reclamation’s largest irrigation project, providing 
roughly 6,800 farmers irrigation water for about 3 million acres 
of land. The farmers receive the water at roughly 10 percent of 
its market value, which in 2002 worked out to an annual subsidy 
of about $416 million a year . . . Who benefits from all these 
federal subsidies? Generally, it’s a small number of large farm 
businesses and landowners. In the CVP the subsidies are heavily 
slanted toward the largest farms. The largest 10 percent of farms 
(roughly 700 farms) in the CVP receive about two-thirds of the 
project’s entire water supply. . . . Thus, to a substantial extent, 
subsidized irrigation farming in the West is “corporate welfare,” 
which comes at the expense of average taxpayers, citizens, and 
the environment.25 
Beyond the CVP critiques focused on the large agribusiness interests 
that receive the lion-share of project water, there have been other 
critiques as well. 
Domestic criticism of Reclamation and CVP irrigation pricing has 
also come from fishery conservation and environmental groups 
generally associated with the political left, who have focused on how 
Reclamation’s CVP freshwater diversions have adversely impacted 
California’s native fisheries by reducing instream flow, and how 
undermarket Reclamation CVP irrigation pricing has led to the farming 
of lands without adequate drainage. For instance, in a 2004 report titled 
California Water Subsidies, the Environmental Working Group found: 
                                                                                                             
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
25 Id. 
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By allowing the planting of water-intensive crops such as rice, 
cotton and alfalfa in what is naturally a desert, [the CVP] has 
discouraged the efficient use of water. 
. . . . 
This inefficiency means less water for wildlife and urban users. 
Wildlife in particular has paid the price. Of 29 fish species 
native to the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and the Bay-
Delta, two are extinct, six are endangered, five are rare and nine 
others are declining. 
Cheap water has also made feasible the continued farming of 
land unsuited for irrigation because of serious drainage and 
toxicity problems. One of the worst environmental disasters in 
the state’s history, the mass death of migratory birds at the 
Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge in Merced County, was the 
result of toxic salts in the soil carried downstream by irrigation 
runoff.26 
Urban water users, who are less closely aligned with either the 
political left or the political right, have also criticized Reclamation 
irrigation pricing. In the 2013 edition of their book Legal Control of 
Water Resources, Professors Barton Thompson, John Leshy and Robert 
Abrams observed: “City residents have wondered why they are paying 
several hundreds of dollars per acre foot for their water while most 
farmers are paying water rates in the double digits.”27 
Beyond the domestic criticism, an international trade dimension is 
now also emerging in the debate over Reclamation irrigation subsidies.28 
The 1994 conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) resulted in the creation of 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the adoption of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“WTO 
Subsidies Agreement”).29 The WTO Subsidies Agreement establishes 
what is referred to as a “traffic light” system, which categorizes 
subsidies as either permitted subsidies (green light), prohibited subsidies 
                                                                                                             
26 California Water Subsidies: Findings, supra note 19; see also Lloyd G. Carter, Reaping 
Riches in a Wretched Region: Subsidized Industrial Farming and Its Link to Perpetual Poverty, 3 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 19–13 (2009). 
27 BARTON H. THOMPSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF 
WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 837 (West 5th ed. 2013). 
28 See Richard Steinberg & Timothy E. Josling, When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of 
EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge, 6 INT’L ECON. L. 369 (2003). 
29 MARC BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM 2–3 (Kluwer 
Law Int’t ed., 2001); see generally Agreement on Subsidies. 
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(red light) or actionable subsidies (amber light).30 Amber 
light/actionable subsidies may be lawfully maintained by a WTO 
member country, but other WTO member countries may be entitled to 
impose “countervailing” measures if they can show evidence of injury.31 
Such countervailing measures might include equivalent tariffs imposed 
on the import of goods from the country maintaining the actionable 
subsidy (tariffs equivalent to offset the injury caused by the subsidy).32 
Under the WTO Subsidies Agreement, the category of actionable 
subsidies includes “government revenue . . . otherwise due [that] is 
foregone” or government provision of goods and services without 
“adequate remuneration.”33 Thus, foregone revenue or inadequate 
remuneration by a WTO member government may qualify as an 
actionable subsidy exposing such country to the imposition of 
countervailing tariffs by other injured WTO member countries.34 
The question explored in this article is whether Reclamation’s 
undermarket prices for irrigation water falls within the scope of the 
forgone revenue and adequate remuneration provisions of the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement. This broader question, which touches on 
Reclamation’s general irrigation price policies and on Reclamation 
projects throughout the United States, is approached initially through a 
case study of WTO compliance issues pertaining to Reclamation’s CVP 
irrigation pricing. The article’s analysis regarding the CVP is then 
placed in the context of Reclamation’s national water project portfolio, 
with guidance on how the article’s mode of analysis as to CVP WTO 
compliance issues might serve as a blueprint for assessing the 
applicability of WTO subsidy disciplines to irrigation pricing for other 
Reclamation projects. 
II. RECLAMATION IRRIGATION PRICING AND THE CENTRAL VALLEY 
PROJECT (“CVP”) 
In 2008, the Governor of California’s Delta Vision Task Force 
released its report on CVP financing and repayment.35 This report began 
by setting the geographic and hydrological context, noting: 
                                                                                                             
30 Agreement on Subsidies pts. I–IV; KEVIN KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
REGULATION: READINGS, CASES, NOTES AND PROBLEMS 608 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2009). 
31 Agreement on Subsidies art. 11.2. 
32 Agreement on Subsidies art. 19. 
33 Agreement on Subsidies arts. 1.1(a)(1)(ii), 14; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 47; KENNEDY, 
supra note 30, at 609. 
34 Agreement on Subsidies art. 19; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 81–82; KENNEDY, supra note 
30, at 609. 
35 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15. 
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California’s Central Valley floor is a 400 mile long alluvial fan. 
Water captured in the northern half of the Valley drains into the 
Sacramento River and its tributaries, and water captured in the 
southern half of the valley drains into the San Joaquin and Tule 
Rivers and their respective tributaries. The Sacramento and San 
Joaquin Rivers eventually converge into the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Delta (Delta) before reaching the Pacific Ocean at the 
Golden Gate Bridge. Precipitation varies significantly from 
north to south. The north end of the Valley receives about two-
thirds of the total Valley precipitation and is prone to severe 
flooding[,] while the southern end receives only one-third of the 
precipitation (and is prone to drought).”36 
The primary purpose of the CVP, initially authorized by the United 
States Congress and United States President Franklin Roosevelt in 
1935, was to construct and install new water infrastructure (dams, 
reservoirs, and canals) that would create new irrigation supplies for 
agriculture in the southern end of the valley.37 Main components of CVP 
water infrastructure include Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, 
Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River, the Delta Mendota Canal, the 
Madera Canal, the Friant Kern Canal, the Delta Cross Channel and the 
Tracy Pumping Plant.38 
In 1948, Robert de Roos published his book The Thirsty Land: The 
Story of the Central Valley Project, which offers an account of the 
motivations of early CVP proponents that captures the boosterish tenor 
of Reclamation activity during this period: 
Nature, which delivers water only during the winter and spring, 
provides too much water in Sacramento Valley and not enough 
in the San Joaquin. Two-thirds of the rain and snow of northern 
California fall in the Sacramento watershed, and the Sacramento 
Valley has only one-third of the arable land of the two valleys. 
And only one-third of the rain and snow reaches the San Joaquin 
Valley, which has two-thirds of the arable land.39 
After setting this broader geographic and hydrologic stage, de Roos then 
explains the underlying raison d’etre for those that proposed, designed 
and built the CVP: 
These great dams and canals and the sizable power system have 
one objective: to shift water from the Sacramento Valley where 
                                                                                                             
36 Id. 
37 DE ROOS, supra note 3, at 8. 
38 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 3; California Water Subsidies: Findings, 
supra note 19. 
39 DE ROOS, supra note 3, at 4. 
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there is too much, to the San Joaquin Valley, where there is too 
little. Simply stated, the Central Valley Project is a north-to-
south water exchange. The available water of the San Joaquin 
River, which normally flows north into San Francisco Bay and 
the sea, is diverted to the dry acres of the southern valley. 
Sacramento River water[,] which ordinarily would wash out the 
Golden Gate, is shifted to the central San Joaquin Valley to 
replace the San Joaquin River water diverted to the south.40 
The federal Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (“RPA”) set forth the 
initial authority and structure for Reclamation to recover its investment 
in constructing, operating and maintaining authorized water projects.41 
The RPA provided for Reclamation to enter into long-term “water 
service contracts” (often for 40 years) for projects, such as the CVP, that 
provided multiple facilities benefiting many contractors.42 Under the 
RPA, costs are allocated to and recovered from beneficiaries based on 
the amount of water received as measured in “acre feet” (“AF”) of 
water.43 
The prices charged to Central Valley farmers by Reclamation 
pursuant to RPA water delivery contracts, however, fell far short of 
such cost recovery.44 The reasons for this shortfall were noted in 2005 
by Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder of the Center for International 
Environmental Law (“CIEL”).45 In her chapter in the Oxford University 
Press book Fresh Water and International Economic Law, Bernasconi-
Osterwalder documented the repayment requirements for Bureau of 
Reclamation irrigation projects throughout the American west, 
explaining: 
In the United States, . . . the federal government is subsidizing 
irrigation systems in various ways. It incorporated a two-stage 
subsidy in the way its sets water prices for irrigation water. 
First, the contractual water prices were based on an irrigator’s 
ability to pay, rather than on the actual costs of supplying the 
water. Secondly, no interest was charged on the loans to fund 
construction costs. Researchers calculated a water subsidy of 
                                                                                                             
40 DE ROOS, supra note 3, at 8. 
41 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 7. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER 
(Aug. 2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7471/ 
08-07-waterallocation.pdf; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Water, Agriculture, and Subsidies 
in the International Trading System, in FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
207, 211–12 (Oxford University Press 2005). 
45 Bernasoconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44. 
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nearly $100 million for seventeen projects alone. The annual 
irrigation subsidies for the United States from such underpricing 
have been estimated at between $2 billion and $2.5 billion.46 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, with special reference to the CVP, continues: 
Because water is inexpensive or free, farmers have no incentive 
to use water sparingly. Instead, they are encouraged to use 
inefficient technology, such as ineffective sprinklers to irrigate 
croplands, or to water crops at the time of day when the 
temperatures are highest and much of the water is lost to 
evaporation. Moreover, by subsidizing irrigation water, 
governments sponsor the planting of water demanding crops. 
For example, three of the main crops grown in California’s 
Central Valley, with a desert-like climate, are water-intensive, 
alfalfa, cotton and rice, although these crops require a much 
moister climate.47 
Similar findings were made in a 2006 paper prepared by the 
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), titled How Federal Policies 
Affect the Allocation of Water.48 The 2006 CBO paper reported: 
Subsidies by the Bureau of Reclamation have reduced the prices 
that irrigators pay for water. In constructing western water 
projects, with the original aim of encouraging settlement, the 
federal government spent $24.0 billion (in nominal dollars) from 
1902 to 2004. Under reclamation law, $19.3 of that is 
“reimbursable”—to be repaid by the projects’ beneficiaries. 
Irrigators are responsible for 46 percent of the total, with power 
users followed by municipal and industrial waters users 
responsible for the rest. Determinations by the federal 
government that irrigators were not able to pay shifted $2.9 
billion of their $8.9 billion debt to other project beneficiaries, 
primarily power users. Also, lawmakers, through specific 
legislation, and the courts subsequently reclassified $2.7 billion 
of irrigators’ debt as nonreimbusrable. As of 2004, irrigators had 
repaid $1.3 billion of their remaining $3.3 billion debt. 
                                                                                                             
46 Id.; see also, Coby Graham, From Dam to Dirt: The Need to Revisit the CVPIA and 
Promote Public Ownership of CVP Water 7 (2013) (unpublished student paper, Golden Gate 
University) (on file with author) (“[I]rrigators are not required to pay interest on the cost of 
construction. This means that, as the cost of money increases over time related to the outstanding 
debt owed by the contractors, the repayment amount by the irrigators eventually accounts for less 
and less of the actual cost of the project, as well as the cost to finance the project.”). 
47 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 212. 
48 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER 
(Aug. 2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7471/ 
08-07-waterallocation.pdf. 
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For irrigators, the Bureau of Reclamation bases its water supply 
charges on recovering the associated capital costs and operation 
and maintenance (O&M) costs for the federal facilities. 
Irrigators’ interest-free payments—which are due over a 40- or 
50-year period—do not incorporate the opportunity costs of the 
federal expenditures. Over a 40-year repayment period at a 
borrowing cost of 4 percent annually, the government recovers 
only 49 percent of its true cost. In some instances, the 
reimbursable costs of existing reclamation projects have yet to 
be recovered and water users’ payment may not even cover 
O&M costs.49 
The 2006 CBO paper continued: 
California’s Central Valley Project—the country’s largest water 
supply project—began deliveries in 1940 and was completed in 
1979. Irrigators are responsible for paying $1.3 million of the 
project’s federal construction cost of $3.6 billion (in nominal 
dollars). Originally, irrigators had renewable 40-year water 
service contracts that provided for water deliveries but not 
necessarily for repaying the $1.3 billion by the end of the 
contract term. The Bureau of Reclamation intended for the 
contract prices to cover only operation and maintenance (O&M) 
expenses and a portion of construction costs. However, the 
prices were not even sufficient to cover O&M expenses, which 
increased over time. Deficits accrued . . . and no payments were 
made for construction costs. . . . [A]s of September 30, 2004, 
irrigators had met 14.2 percent of their total repayment 
obligation.50 
The 2012 Cato Institute report, discussed above, echoed these findings, 
observing: 
One early decision by the Bureau of Reclamation led to large 
investment inefficiencies for much of the 20th century. The 1902 
legislation state[s] that “charges shall be determined with a view 
of returning to the reclamation fund the estimated cost of 
construction of the project.” In interpreting this, the Bureau 
decided to exclude interest costs, so that project beneficiaries 
would be required to pay back only the original project costs 
over time. The effect was to greatly reduce the real value of 
repayments, thus creating large subsidies on Reclamation 
projects51 
                                                                                                             
49 Id. at 5–6. 
50 Id. at 7. 
51 EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13, at 3. 
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. . . . 
Agriculture has received by far the largest subsidies from 
Reclamation projects. In calculating repayment requirements, 
Reclamation allocates substantial costs related to irrigation to 
other project beneficiaries, such as power customers and urban 
water customers. Also, a law change in 1939 allowed the bureau 
to reduce costs to irrigators on the basis of “ability to pay,” 
which has saved farmers billions of dollars over the decades.52 
In response to criticisms regarding the lax repayment/cost recovery 
terms in the CVP water delivery contracts entered into by Reclamation, 
the federal Central Valley Improvement Act (“CVPIA”) was enacted in 
1992.53 Although CVPIA resulted in certain changes to the terms of 
renewed CVP water delivery contracts, such as reduced duration (down 
to 25 years) and periodic price adjustments, research indicates that post-
CVPIA contracts for CVP irrigation water are still considerably 
undermarket.54 For instance, the 2004 Environmental Working Group 
report California Water Subsidies (discussed above) found: 
[D]epending on how the market value of the water is defined, 
CVP farmers are receiving between $60 million and $416 
million in water subsidies each year. The first figure [$60 
million] represents the subsidy if the water is priced at the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s so-called “full cost rate,” which in 
practice is much less than the actual full cost of delivering water 
to recipients. The higher figure [$416 million] comes from 
comparing the average price for CVP water to the estimated 
costs of replacement water supplies from proposed dams and 
reservoirs on the San Joaquin River. An intermediate figure is 
$305 million a year, reflecting the difference between the 
average CVP rate and the price paid for CVP water by the 
Environmental Water Account, a state-federal joint agency, to 
restore fish and wildlife habitat in the Bay Delta. 
No matter what market value is used for comparison, the total 
subsidy to CVP farmers exceeds the actual amount they paid in 
2002, about $48 million. That means CVP water users are 
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53 Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub L. No. 102-575, tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4600, 
4706 (1992); DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15; California Water Subsidies: About the 
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getting a minimum discount of 55 percent below market value, 
ranging up to almost 90 percent, for the water they receive.55 
The 2008 report by the Delta Vision Task Force (noted above) also 
concluded that Central Valley farmers, particularly those in the San 
Joaquin Valley, had failed by a large margin to repay or reimburse their 
share of CVP costs: 
The CVP provides project water to both irrigation and M&I 
[municipal and industrial] contractors in the San Joaquin Valley. 
Current San Joaquin Valley capital repayment responsibilities 
are $993.2 million, which represents over 77 percent of the total 
[CVP] capital costs of nearly $1.3 billion. Irrigators [were] 
responsible for $955 million or 96.2 percent of the reimbursable 
total and M&I contractors are responsible for the remaining 
$38.1 million. 
. . . . 
As of September 30, 2006, the San Joaquin Valley contractors 
had repaid $193.8 million or 19.6 percent of total allocated 
costs, leaving net capital costs of $797.7 million to be repaid. 
Irrigation contractors had repaid $184.7 million (19.3 percent), 
leaving $769.7 million unpaid.56 
Irrigation subsidies are sometimes defined using the “cost recovery” 
method. This method defines an irrigation subsidy as the net value of 
government expenditures that benefit irrigating farmers and the 
revenues from water charges paid by the irrigators to the government.57 
This calculation of irrigation subsidies under the cost recovery 
methodology should take into account that construction of large-scale 
water infrastructure projects (like the CVP) can take several years to 
complete, so the amount of the underlying government expenditure used 
to calculate the extent of subsidies may not be fixed over time.58 
The fact that Reclamation’s CVP reservoirs, pumps and canals were 
constructed in phases over many decades, and that the prices charged by 
Reclamation under CVP water delivery contracts have undergone 
changes over time, adds a layer of complexity to the calculation of CVP 
irrigation subsidies. As reflected in the research and analysis undertaken 
by the Environmental Working Group in 2004 and the Delta Vision 
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Task Force in 2008, however, the complexity of this calculation is not 
insurmountable, particularly in the light of the extensive CVP cost and 
pricing information that Reclamation is required to publish.59 
Whether one relies on the costs-recovery methodology, or whether 
one relies on a comparative evaluation of pricing with other markets for 
water (such as the prices paid by municipalities or the Environmental 
Water Account), there is strong evidentiary support for the conclusion 
that Reclamation’s current CVP pricing for irrigation deliveries to 
California farms meets standard notions of a subsidy, and that this 
irrigation subsidy is substantial in monetary terms. 
III. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (“WTO”) RULES ON SUBSIDIES 
A. Foregone Revenue Provisions of 1994 WTO Subsidies Agreement 
As a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, 
in 1994 the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) became the successor 
entity to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).60 Prior 
to 1994, the term GATT referred both to the underlying GATT treaty, as 
well as the ad hoc administrative apparatus that developed to implement 
and ensure compliance with the GATT treaty.61 At the time the WTO 
was established in 1994, the members to GATT (including the United 
States) also entered into a series of other trade-related agreements, 
including the WTO Subsidies Agreement.62 The WTO Subsidies 
Agreement builds on traditional notions of subsidies, such as the cost 
recovery methodology noted above, but also sets forth a unique set of 
terminology, requirements, exemptions and remedies. 
In terms of general structure, the WTO Subsidies Agreement is based 
on what is referred to as a “traffic light” system with three basic 
categories of subsidies.63 The first category is “green light” subsidies, 
which are permitted.64 The second category is “red light” subsidies, 
                                                                                                             
59 California Water Subsidies: Methodology, supra note 57; DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, 
supra note 15, at 12; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 210–11; MONA SUR, DINA 
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60 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
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61 Marrakesh Agreement art. II(4); BENITAH, supra note 29, at 3. 
62 KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 608. 
63 Agreement on Subsidies pts. II–IV; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 34–35, 47; KENNEDY, supra 
note 30, at 608. 
64 Agreement on Subsidies pt. III; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 34; KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 
608. 
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which are prohibited; members may bring an action before the WTO to 
compel a member to discontinue these types of subsidies.65 For 
example, certain direct export subsidies are prohibited as red light 
subsidies.66 The third category is “amber light” subsidies, which are 
“actionable.”67 “Amber light” or “actionable” subsidies can be 
maintained by a WTO member country (such as the United States), but 
other WTO member countries may be entitled to impose 
“countervailing” measures against the country that maintains an 
“actionable” subsidy if it can establish that the subsidy caused 
“injury.”68 Such countervailing measures might include equivalent 
tariffs imposed on the import of goods from the country maintaining the 
actionable subsidy (tariffs equal to, and that offset, the injury caused by 
the subsidy).69 
For example, in 2002 Brazil brought a challenge against the United 
States before the WTO alleging violations of the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement in regard to cotton produced in the United States.70 Among 
other things, Brazil alleged that the United States extended price 
supports and export credits to domestic cotton producers that qualified 
as actionable amber light subsidies under the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement.71 In September 2004, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
issued a panel report siding with Brazil.72 Most of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body’s ruling was affirmed in March 2005 by the WTO 
Appellate Body.73 In August 2009, a WTO arbitration panel determined 
that Brazil was entitled to impose $147.3 million in countervailing 
import tariffs against United States goods.74 
The Brazil WTO cotton challenge involved direct price supports and 
export credits for a specific agricultural product (cotton) rather than the 
indirect “input” subsidization of agricultural products in general via 
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delivery of undermarket irrigation water. However, under the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement, the category of actionable subsidies appears to 
include domestic subsidies that are not directly tied to such products. 
Articles 1, 2 and 14 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement provides that 
such domestic subsidies exist when the following conditions are 
present: (i) “a financial contribution [is made] by a government or any 
public body within the territory of Member” (ii) which establishes a 
benefit (iii) that is specific to certain enterprises.75 Article 1 of the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement then identifies four categories of “financial 
contributions”: (a) a “direct transfer of funds” or “potential direct 
transfers of funds or liabilities”; (b) “government revenue . . . otherwise 
due [that] is foregone or not collected”; (c) government provision of 
“goods or services other than general infrastructure”; [and] (d) 
government purchase of goods.”76 
Article I of the WTO Subsidies Agreement does not set forth a 
definition of what constitutes “government revenue . . . otherwise due 
[that] is foregone or not collected.”77 However, some guidance on this 
question may potentially be gleaned from Article 14 of the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement, which is titled Calculation of the Amount of a 
Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Recipient.78 More specifically, 
Article 14(d) provides: 
[A]ny method used by the investigating authority to calculate 
the benefit to the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
Article 1 . . . shall be transparent and adequately explained. 
Furthermore, any such method shall be consistent with the 
following guidelines:79 
. . . . 
(d)  the provision of goods or services or purchase of 
goods by a government shall not considered as conferring a 
benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate 
remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate 
remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be 
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the 
good or service in question in the country of provision or 
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purchase (including price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation or other conditions of purchase or sale).80 
Although Article 14(d) focuses on the question of “calculating” the 
extent of a good provided without “adequate remuneration” rather than 
on the existence of an actionable subsidy due to “foregone revenue,” its 
analytic framework is potentially instructive and relevant. Article 14(d) 
proposes that the amount of the monetary benefit provided by a subsidy 
can be appropriately determined with reference to the “prevailing 
market conditions” for the product in question in the country where the 
subsidy is provided, and suggests that “price” is a fundamental aspect of 
such “prevailing market conditions.”81 If a comparison to prevailing 
market prices for the good in question is appropriate to determine the 
benefits of a subsidy, it could be argued that such a comparison may 
also be appropriate to determine whether or not government revenue is 
improperly “foregone” pursuant to Article I of the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement.82 Such a parallel approach seems warranted since both 
inquiries hinge on the question of whether “adequate remuneration” was 
provided to the government for the supplied good. 
As a result of the investigation and findings of the 2004 
Environmental Working Group report and the 2008 Delta Vision Task 
Force report, there is substantial uncontroverted evidence to support the 
claim that CVP irrigation pricing is not set at levels that enable 
Reclamation to recoup its construction or operational costs, and that 
such “foregone revenue” in CVP pricing provides a “good or service” 
that is of benefit to California farms that receive irrigation at these 
undermarket prices.83 Consistent with the approach suggested in Article 
14(d) of the WTO Subsidies Agreement, this claim could be grounded 
in the great disparity between Reclamation’s CVP irrigation prices and 
the prevailing California marketplace for non-CVP water.84 Before 
Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing is determined to be an actionable 
subsidy per WTO rules, however, there are additional questions that 
must be resolved. 
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B. Do Reclamation’s CVP Irrigation Subsidies Qualify as Foregone 
Revenue? 
1. Revenue Otherwise Due—Pertinent WTO Cases 
Per Article 1 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement, one of the categories 
of financial contributions that may qualify as an actionable domestic 
subsidy is “government revenue . . . otherwise due [that] is foregone or 
not collected.”85 This raises the question of whether “full cost/actual 
cost” or “market” pricing of CVP irrigation water delivered by 
Reclamation should be viewed as revenue “otherwise due” that has been 
“forgone” based on the reduced pricing in CVP water delivery 
contracts. The text of the WTO Subsidies Agreement does not provide 
any further clarification of what the phrase “revenue otherwise due” 
means, but previous WTO cases provide guidance on the phrase’s 
potential interpretation in the context of a challenge to Reclamation’s 
CVP irrigation pricing. 
a. WTO Appellate Body FSC Report 
In 2002 the WTO Appellate Body issued its Report in United 
States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (“WTO 
Appellate Body FSC Report”).86 This case involved a challenge by the 
European Communities against the United States policy of non-taxation 
of income earned through exports by entities recognized under United 
States law as Foreign Sales Corporations.87 In the WTO Appellate Body 
FSC Report, the narrower and more formalist construction of “revenue 
otherwise due” proposed by the United States was rejected.88 Instead, 
the WTO Appellate Body held: 
[U]nder Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) [of the WTO Subsidies Agreement] 
a “financial contribution” does not arise simply because a 
government does not raise revenue it could have raised. It is true 
that, from a fiscal perspective, where a government chooses not 
to tax certain income, no revenue is “due” on that income. 
However, although a government might, in a sense, be said to 
“forego” revenue in this situation, this alone gives no indication 
as to whether the revenue foregone was “otherwise due.” In 
other words, the mere fact that revenues are not “due” from a 
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fiscal perspective does not determine that the revenues are or are 
not “otherwise due” within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) 
of the [WTO Subsidies Agreement].” 
. . . . 
[T]he normative benchmark for determining whether revenue 
foregone is otherwise due must allow a comparison of the fiscal 
treatment of comparable income, in the hands of taxpayers in 
similar situations.89 
The WTO Appellate Body FSC Report generally affirmed the WTO 
Panel FSC Report’s previous holding that: 
To give due meaning and effect to Article 1.1 of the [WTO 
Subsidies Agreement], our examination as to whether there is 
revenue foregone that is “otherwise due” must be based on 
actual substantive realities and not be restricted to pure 
formalism. 
. . . . 
[A] government could opt to bestow financial contributions in 
the form of fiscal incentives simply by modulating the “outer 
boundary” of its “tax jurisdiction” or by manipulating the 
definition of the tax base to accommodate any “exclusion” or 
“exemption” or “exception” it desired, so that there could never 
be a foregoing of revenue “otherwise due.” This would have the 
effect of reducing paragraph (ii) of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
[WTO Subsidies Agreement] to “redundancy and inutility” and 
cannot be the appropriate implication to draw . . . such an 
approach would eviscerate the subsidies disciplines in the 
[WTO Subsidies Agreement].90 
To the extent the United States may attempt to counter a WTO 
challenge to Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing on the grounds that 
additional revenue from irrigators is not “otherwise due” because 
Reclamation has not adopted policies that require the payment of such 
additional revenues or because applicable Reclamation law and 
regulations may prohibit such payment, this more narrow formalistic 
line of reasoning would run counter to the approach endorsed by the 
WTO Appellate Body FSC Report. 
If the approach employed by the WTO Appellate Body FSC Report 
were followed in the context of a WTO challenge to Reclamation’s 
CVP irrigation pricing, the focus would be on the “substantive realities” 
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of the CVP undermarket pricing, which would presumably employ the 
approach adopted in the 2004 Environmental Working Group Report 
and the 2008 Delta Vision Task Force Report.91 In the case of 
Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing, the pertinent “substantive 
realities” are likely to include the extent of unreimbursed Reclamation 
construction/operational costs and the comparatively high cost for non-
farming parties (such as cities and the Environmental Water Account) to 
acquire CVP water vis-á-vis the comparatively low cost CVP water 
offered to farms. 
b. WTO Appellate Body Aircraft Report 
The focus on the market price for water to evaluate Reclamation’s 
CVP irrigation subsidies for WTO compliance would also accord with 
the approach in the WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada—
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (“WTO Appellate 
Body Aircraft Report”).92 In this decision, which did not directly address 
the question of “revenue otherwise due,” the WTO Appellate Body 
ruled that the existence of a domestic “benefit” provided by the 
government can often be determined by comparison with the 
marketplace, that is, on the basis of the terms a recipient would have 
received the goods or services in question on the open market.93 The 
approach in the WTO Appellate Body Aircraft Report is consistent with 
the method of subsidy analysis used in the 2004 Environmental 
Working Group Report to evaluate Reclamation’s CVP irrigation 
pricing. That is, just as in the WTO Appellate Body Aircraft Report, the 
2004 Environmental Working Group report focused on pricing for the 
product in question (fresh water) in the broader marketplace. 
c. WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report 
As discussed above, Article 14 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement, 
titled Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to 
the Recipient, provides that a comparison with “prevailing market 
conditions” can serve as an appropriate basis for determining the extent 
to which the government provides goods or services to recipients 
without receiving adequate remuneration.94 The interpretation of Article 
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14(d) of the WTO Subsidies Agreement was prominent in the 2003 
WTO Appellate Body Report on United States—Final Countering Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada 
(“WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report”).95 This case involved 
claims that Canada was providing Canadian logging companies access 
to public forests (via low “stumpage” fees for such logging) at 
undermarket rates, and that such rates constituted actionable subsidies 
under the WTO Subsidies Agreement.96 
The WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report found: 
Article 14(d) [of the WTO Subsidies Agreement] establishes 
that the provision of goods by a government shall not be 
considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made 
for less than adequate remuneration. . . . Thus, a benefit is 
conferred when a government provides goods to a recipient and, 
in return, receives insufficient payment or compensation for 
those goods. 
The question then becomes how to determine whether adequate 
remuneration was paid for the goods provided by the 
government. This is dealt with in the second sentence of Article 
14(d), which provides that “[t]he adequacy of remuneration 
shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions 
for the good or service in question in the country of 
provision . . . “97 
. . . . 
Although Article 14(d) does not dictate that private prices are to 
be used as the exclusive benchmark in all situations, it does 
emphasize by its terms that prices of similar goods sold by 
private suppliers in the country of provision are the primary 
benchmark that investigating authorities must use when 
determining whether goods have been provided by a 
government for less than adequate remuneration. . . . This 
approach reflects the fact that private prices in the market of 
provision will generally represent an appropriate measure of the 
“adequate remuneration” for the provision of goods.98 
Although confirming that prevailing market prices for the good in 
question will serve as the “primary benchmark” for determining 
whether a government has received adequate remuneration for a good 
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provided, and although confirming that prevailing market prices will 
“generally represent an appropriate measure” of such adequate 
remuneration, the WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report 
recognized that such an approach may not be appropriate in every 
instance.99 More specifically, it noted that in a situation where there are 
no “prevailing market conditions” for the good due to the 
overwhelmingly predominant role of government in providing the 
particular good, comparison to some other reference or methodology 
may be warranted.100 The decision discussed potential “alternative 
benchmarks” but explained that such “alternative benchmarks” were not 
warranted in this instance because prevailing market conditions and 
pricing served as an adequate measure. In this regard, the WTO 
Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report found: 
[T]he question thus arises what alternative benchmark, 
consistent with Article 14(d), could be available in such a 
situation, for purposes of determining whether the goods have 
been provided by the government for less than adequate 
remuneration. 
. . . . 
We agree with the submission of the participants and third party 
participants that alternative methods for determining the 
adequacy of remuneration could include . . . proxies constructed 
on the basis of production costs.101 
In the context of a potential WTO challenge to Reclamation’s CVP 
irrigation pricing, the WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report 
may be pertinent in at least two respects. First, the report confirmed that 
in most situations, prevailing market prices should serve as the 
benchmark for determining whether the amount paid to the government 
by the recipients of the benefit of this good constituted adequate 
remuneration.102 Second, the report suggested that to the extent the 
government’s predominate role in providing the particular good makes a 
comparison to prevailing market prices inappropriate, “production 
costs” may suffice as an “alternative benchmark.”103 In the context of 
Reclamation CVP water, the “production costs” of providing this water 
would presumably include both the costs (in current dollars) of 
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constructing CVP facilities and their ongoing operation and 
maintenance (“O&M”) costs. 
d. WTO Cotton Subsidies Report 
Another informative case is the 2007 WTO Compliance Panel report 
in United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (“WTO Cotton Subsidies 
Report”).104 In this dispute, Brazil had alleged (among other things) that 
the United States export credit program for domestically grown cotton 
amounted to an actionable subsidy under the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement.105 In support of this position, Brazil asked the WTO 
Compliance Panel to take into consideration the minimum premium 
rates (“MPRs”) provided in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s (“OECD”) Arrangement for Officially Supported 
Export Credits (“OECD Export Credit Arrangement”) as evidentiary 
support that the pricing under the United States cotton export credit 
program qualified as an actionable subsidy.106 Although rejecting the 
OECD Export Credit Arrangement rates as a “legally binding 
benchmark” to determine whether the United States cotton export credit 
rates qualified as a subsidy, the WTO Compliance Panel found that, 
“from an evidentiary standpoint,” the OECD Export Credit 
Arrangement rates provided an indication of whether the United States 
cotton export credit rates, or GSM 102 fees, were “sufficient to cover 
the long-term operating costs and losses” of the United States 
program.107 As the Compliance Panel explained in the WTO Cotton 
Subsidies Report: 
Brazil asks us to take into consideration its comparison of GSM 
102 fees with the [OECD Export Credit Arrangement] MPRs as 
a “qualitative” demonstration that GSM 102 fees are well below 
the level at which they should be . . .We note that the OECD 
explains that the Arrangement’s benchmark rates, including 
MPRs, are set “to ensure that Participants to the Arrangement 
charge premium rates in addition to interest charges that . . . are 
not inadequate to cover long-term operating costs and losses 
associated with the provision of export credits.”108 
. . . . 
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The MPRs may thus be regarded as representing an assessment, 
developed by and agreed upon by the export credit experts of 
the Participants to the Arrangement, of the premia levels that are 
necessary to ensure that export credit guarantee programmes 
cover their long-term operating costs and losses.109 
. . . . 
We consider that, in this particular case, because of the 
magnitude of the difference between the MPRs and GSM 102 
fees, the MPRs may provide an indication, on an informed basis, 
of the fact that the GSM 102 fees are set at a level which is 
insufficient to cover the long term operating costs and losses of 
the programme . . . On average, the MPRs are 106 percent 
above GSM 102 fees.110 
The WTO Cotton Subsidies Report did not focus specifically on the 
“foregone revenue” provision of the WTO Subsidies Agreement.111 
Nonetheless, the WTO Cotton Subsidies Report’s willingness to consult 
outside costing standards (OECD Export Credit Arrangement rates) in 
determining the existence of a subsidy may be pertinent to an evaluation 
of whether Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing is WTO compliant.112 
More specifically, the ruling in the WTO Cotton Subsidies Report 
suggests that (in the context of a challenge under the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement) valuating Reclamation’s CVP irrigation water pricing 
against accepted outside standards such as cost-recovery methodology 
or comparative market rates may be appropriate. 
Although the WTO Appellate Body FSC Report, WTO Appellate 
Body Aircraft Report, WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report 
and WTO Cotton Subsidies Report collectively offer support for the 
claim that Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing qualifies as foregone 
revenue or inadequate remuneration under the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement, it is important to note that the issue remains unsettled at 
present under WTO law. Professor Marc Benitah, in his book The Law 
of Subsidies under the GATT/WTO System, notes the “inherent 
instability” of the “otherwise due” concept set forth in the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement, and emphasizes that there may be instances 
where it is difficult to identify an appropriate “universal set of 
reference” against which to compare a particular domestic program to 
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determine the existence or extent of an alleged subsidy.113 The costing 
and water market analysis of Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing 
provided by the Environmental Working Group (discussed above) might 
provide the appropriate “universal set of reference” that Professor 
Benitah suggests may be needed to support a “foregone revenue” WTO 
claim. 
Beyond the challenge of articulating a proper “benchmark” or 
“universal set of reference” upon which to determine whether 
Reclamation’s CVP undermarket irrigation pricing constitutes a 
subsidy, a potential WTO case would also need to establish the causal 
correlation between undermarket CVP irrigation pricing and the 
displacement (lost market share) of products produced and sold by the 
country bringing the WTO complaint.114 As Professors Richard 
Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling noted in their article on the 
vulnerability of United States agricultural subsidies under WTO rules, 
there can often be competing or alternative causal explanations for 
product displacement and lost market share that do not relate to the 
pricing of products from other nations.115 For instance, there may be 
fluctuations in demand and supply in certain sectors or at certain periods 
of time, or distinctions in the quality and characteristics of similar 
products, which suggest that below market pricing (and therefore the 
subsidies that resulted in this pricing) played a fairly minimal role in 
market displacement.116 A more detailed examination of the subsidy-
displacement causal component is outside the scope of this article, but 
for present purposes it suffices to recognize that, for a complaining 
party to successfully bring a WTO claim based on undermarket CVP 
irrigation pricing by Reclamation, it would need to establish that this 
pricing caused them direct and significant economic injury. 
2. Specificity Requirement 
As noted above, one of the elements of an actionable subsidy under 
the WTO Subsidies Agreement is that it must be “specific to [certain] 
enterprises.”117 In the context of the CVP, the question is therefore 
whether Reclamation’s undermarket pricing for irrigation to Central 
Valley farms in water delivery contracts satisfies this “specificity” 
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requirement. Bernasconi-Osterwalder provides a useful framework for 
considering the specificity element: 
The question raised in the context of agricultural subsidies is 
whether the specificity requirement is to be construed broadly or 
narrowly. Under a broad view, any agricultural subsidy would 
have to be considered specific by the mere fact that it is sector-
specific. Under a narrower approach, however, agricultural 
subsidies, such as irrigation subsidies, would not necessarily 
qualify as specific just because they concern one sector. In the 
latter case, one could still argue that the subsidized irrigation 
schemes are specific because they are limited to farmers within 
a designated geographical region.118 
There may be two ways in which Reclamation’s CVP irrigation 
pricing contains the necessary specificity under the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement. First, geographically, CVP irrigation subsidies are only 
provided to California farms located in the Sacramento Valley and San 
Joaquin Valley, so such subsidies seem specific in terms of the location 
where such water may be delivered and used.119 Second, Reclamation’s 
undermarket CVP irrigation pricing terms are specific to water used in 
farm irrigation, which is to say in the agricultural sector.120 There are 
different, more expensive, CVP pricing terms for municipal water and 
water purchased by the Environmental Water Account for instream 
fisheries.121 The CVP irrigation pricing therefore appears to be specific 
to a particular economic sector (provided that agriculture/farming is 
recognized as a particular sector). 
3. General Infrastructure Exemption 
Article 1 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement provides that the 
government’s delivery of goods and services may be actionable so long 
as they are not “general infrastructure.”122 Reclamation’s provision of 
undermarket CVP irrigation to California farms is arguably a “service” 
and presumably water constitutes a “good” given that it is an essential 
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input in crop production. What remains less clear is whether 
Reclamation’s delivery of CVP water for farm irrigation might properly 
be characterized as “general infrastructure.” 
Although the WTO Subsidies Agreement does not elaborate on what 
constitutes “general infrastructure,” the 1994 WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture offers some potential guidance.123 More specifically, Annex 
2(g) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture provides a list of “general 
services” offered by the government that are outside the scope of 
subsidy discipline provisions in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.124 
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture’s definition of its “general 
services” exemption might suggest the potential scope and parameters 
of the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s definition of its “general 
infrastructure” exemption.125 Annex 2(g) of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture provides in pertinent part: 
General Services . . . Policies in this category involve 
expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to programmes 
which provide services or benefits to agriculture or the rural 
community. . . . Such programmes include . . . (g) infrastructural 
services, including: electricity reticulation, roads and other 
means of transport, market and port facilities, water supply 
facilities, dams and drainage schemes. . . . In all cases the 
expenditure shall be directed to the provision or construction of 
the capital works only. . . . It shall not include subsidies to 
inputs or operating costs, or preferential user charges.126 
When applied to Reclamation’s CVP irrigation subsidies, the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture’s Annex 2(g) definition of “general services” 
does not supply a straightforward determination. On one hand, Annex 
2(g)’s specific reference to “water supply facilities” and “dams” 
suggests that the type of water infrastructure included in the CVP, e.g., 
dams, canals and pumps, may fall within the “general services” 
exemption.127 Yet, Annex 2(g) goes on to clarify that for a government 
expenditure to properly fall within the “general services” exemption, it 
must be limited to “construction” costs and cannot include subsidies for 
“input,” “operating costs” or “preferential user charges.”128 It is well 
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established that Reclamation has provided and does provide preferential 
undermarket water pricing to agricultural irrigation consumers as 
compared to other non-farming users of CVP water, and the 2004 
Environmental Working Group Report found that current CVP 
irrigation pricing continued to subsidize “operational” and 
“construction” costs.129 It also appears that irrigation water is a critical 
input in the production of Central Valley crops, particularly in the more 
arid San Joaquin Valley.130 These considerations suggest that, even 
though the CVP contains water supply facilities and dams, there are 
aspects of the undermarket irrigation pricing in Reclamation’s water 
delivery contracts that place such pricing outside the Annex 2(g) 
“general services” exemption.131 
The extent to which the WTO Agreement on Agriculture’s Annex 
2(g) exemption might serve as a guide to interpreting the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement’s “general infrastructure” exemptions remains an 
open question. However, if the Annex 2(g) general services exemption 
is an accurate guide to how the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s 
infrastructure exemption may be interpreted, then the undermarket 
irrigation pricing in Reclamation’s water delivery contracts may be 
outside the general infrastructure exemption and within the scope of the 
WTO Subsidies Agreement. 
4. Non-Farming Recipients of Reclamation’s CVP Water 
To the extent the sole purpose of the CVP was to deliver irrigation to 
farms for crop production, the analysis above suggests that there is a 
strong basis to assert that the CVP irrigation pricing in Reclamation 
water delivery contracts meets the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s 
“specificity” requirement and that such pricing also falls outside the 
scope of the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s “general infrastructure” 
exemption. Further, the analysis suggests that there would be a credible 
basis to assert that Reclamation’s undermarket CVP irrigation pricing 
should be characterized as “revenue otherwise due” under the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement. This line of reasoning may be complicated, 
however, by the fact that the CVP has purposes beyond delivering 
irrigation to private farms for crop production.132 
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As noted in both the 2004 Environmental Working Group Report and 
the 2008 Delta Vision Task Force Report, Reclamation also delivers 
CVP water to cities for domestic municipal use (e.g., drinking water).133 
The CVP’s dams, canals and pumps therefore also serve water to these 
non-farming beneficiaries.134 There appears little doubt that a 
government may subsidize the provision of municipal water to its 
citizens for essential drinking water and health (or even provide such 
municipal water free of charge to its citizens) without running afoul of 
the WTO Subsidies Agreement.135 In this context, the water is not an 
input to a good that is produced and could be internationally traded. 
Additionally, to hold otherwise might run counter to the emerging 
recognition of a right to water for basic human needs such as hydration 
and sanitation.136 In the case of the CVP, the question that arises is 
therefore whether the fact that Reclamation’s CVP facilities also 
provide some limited water to non-farming beneficiaries somehow 
places Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing beyond the reach of the 
WTO Subsidies Agreement. 
Based on the analysis and findings in the 2004 Environmental 
Working Group Report and the 2008 Delta Vision Task Force Report, 
the vast majority of Reclamation’s CVP water is delivered to Central 
Valley farms for irrigation rather than to cities for municipal use.137 The 
delivery of a relatively small percentage of CVP water to cities for 
domestic municipal use (whose pricing may well fall outside the scope 
of the WTO Subsidies Agreement) does not appear to provide adequate 
legal grounds to also place Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing 
outside the scope of the WTO Subsidies Agreement. In the context of 
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, it is not Reclamation or the CVP as a 
whole that would be challenged as an actionable subsidy. Rather, the 
subject of this WTO challenge would be Reclamation’s particular 
undermarket prices for irrigation for Central Valley farms in CVP water 
delivery contracts. 
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IV. NOT JUST THE CVP—OTHER RECLAMATION PROJECTS AND PRICES 
SUBJECT TO WTO RULES 
Much of the preceding analysis has centered on the CVP and the 
extent to which Reclamation’s CVP irrigation prices may constitute an 
actionable amber light subsidy under the WTO Subsidies Agreement. It 
is critical, however, to situate this CVP specific analysis in the context 
of not only other Reclamation irrigation projects but also of 
Reclamation’s national irrigation price policies. 
A. WTO Recourse for Other Reclamation Irrigation Projects 
As discussed above, in addition to the CVP, there are many other 
Reclamation water projects in the arid west of the United States, such as 
the Rio Grande Project in New Mexico,138 the Salt River Project in 
Arizona,139 the Boulder Canyon Project on the Nevada-Arizona 
Border,140 the Newlands Project in Nevada,141 and the Parker-Davis 
Project in California.142 The basic methodology used in this article to 
examine whether Reclamation’s prices for CVP irrigation water qualify 
as an actionable WTO subsidy can be employed to examine WTO 
compliance for other Reclamation projects. 
For example, consider the case of Reclamation’s Newlands Project. 
The Newlands Project, formerly known as the Truckee-Carson Project, 
predates the CVP and its initial components were constructed from 
1903–1904.143 The project delivers irrigation water to approximately 
55,000 acres of Nevada cropland in the Lahontan Valley and 
benchlands located in Churchill, Lyon, Storey and Washoe counties.144 
In addition to alfalfa, a significant portion of the crops grown with 
Newlands Project irrigation water are cereal crops, such as barley, 
wheat and oats.145 Just as with the irrigation pricing for the CVP, the 
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price for Newlands Project irrigation deliveries is established pursuant 
to long-term water service contracts with Reclamation, which in turn are 
established pursuant to the regulatory pricing approach laid out in the 
1902 Reclamation Act and the 1939 Reclamation Project Act (with no 
interest on initial construction costs and periodic reduction in prices due 
to farms “ability to pay”). 
To evaluate whether Reclamation’s Newlands Project irrigation 
pricing constitutes an actionable amber light subsidy under the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement, the following information and determinations 
would be involved: determination of the construction costs (in initial 
and current dollars) for the Newlands Project infrastructure; the 
Newlands Project irrigation pricing in water service contracts with 
Reclamation; a comparison of Reclamation’s Newlands Project 
irrigation pricing with the construction costs and ongoing O&M costs 
for the Newlands Project; a comparison of Reclamation’s Newlands 
Project irrigation pricing with prevailing water marketplace prices in the 
area that receives water from the project; and identification of whether 
there are other WTO member nations, such as those that grow and 
export cereal crops like barley, wheat and oats, that are being adversely 
impacted by the reduced prices charged by Nevada farms growing and 
selling these same cereal crops. 
The WTO compliance analysis presented in this article can therefore 
be replicated for other non-CVP Reclamation irrigation projects around 
the country. 
B. WTO Recourse for Reclamation’s General Irrigation Pricing 
Policies 
As noted above, the 1902 Reclamation Act and the 1939 Reclamation 
Project Act provide the broad national regulatory framework by which 
Reclamation enters into project-specific supply contracts for irrigation 
water. This national regulatory structure raises the question of whether, 
in addition to project-specific potential WTO challenges to Reclamation 
irrigation pricing, there is legal support to argue that Reclamation’s 
national irrigation pricing scheme is an actionable subsidy under WTO 
rules. For two reasons, it is questionable whether a broad WTO 
challenge to Reclamation along these lines would succeed. 
First, as discussed above, there is the hurdle of the “specificity” 
requirement in Article 2 of the WTO Subsides Agreement.146 In the case 
of a challenge to irrigation pricing for specific Reclamation projects, 
                                                                                                             
146 Agreement on Subsidies art. 2. 
290 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 32:259 
there are distinct geographic areas of farmland that receive the water, 
such as California’s Central Valley in the case of the CVP or Nevada’s 
Churchill, Lyon, Storey and Washoe counties in the case of the 
Newlands Project. Moreover, the geographic farming region serviced by 
a particular Reclamation Project often tends to focus on certain 
particular crops, such as rice and cotton in the case of the CVP or cereal 
crops in the case of the Newlands Project. With a WTO challenge to 
Reclamation’s general nationwide irrigation pricing scheme, the 
beneficiaries of such pricing are farms across the entire United States, 
which grow a wide assortment of crops. A group of beneficiaries 
defined so broadly in terms of geography and crop selection may not be 
specific enough to fall within the scope of the pertinent WTO subsidy 
rules. 
Second, as also noted above, an evaluation of the existence and 
extent of a Reclamation irrigation subsidy may involve a comparison of 
Reclamation irrigation prices with the “prevailing” water 
marketplace.147 In the case of geographically specific Reclamation 
projects, the prevailing marketplace would presumably be the market 
for water in the state or sub-state region where lands receiving the 
Reclamation project water are located. Under a WTO challenge to 
Reclamation’s general nationwide irrigation pricing, it is unclear 
whether there exists a “national prevailing water marketplace.” The high 
costs associated with the pumping and delivery of water means that it 
can be prohibitively costly to transport water long distances, and 
economic and climate variations across the country produce vastly 
different prevailing water marketplaces between regions. For instance, 
the prevailing per-acre foot price for irrigation water in an arid state like 
Arizona would not be the same as the prevailing per-acre foot price for 
a wetter state like Montana.148 The absence of a discernible prevailing 
national water market could be a potential obstacle to a broad WTO 
challenge to Reclamation’s general irrigation pricing policies. 
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V. CONCLUSION—WTO SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES AND THE WASTEFUL USE 
OF WATER 
In the United States, the debate over Reclamation’s irrigation prices 
has so far played out more in the arena of politics and public policy than 
the law.149 Regardless of whether the critiques of Reclamation irrigation 
pricing have come from groups on the political right, such as the Cato 
Institute, or groups on the political left, such as the Environmental 
Working Group, the characterization of such pricing as a “subsidy” has 
been used to convey the view that Reclamation’s pricing is unwise and 
unjustifiable from a policy standpoint.150 These domestic critiques have 
not yet alleged that there is a direct and independent legal consequence 
to the designation of Reclamation’s irrigation pricing as a subsidy. 
With an eye toward such direct and independent legal consequences, 
this article has evaluated the potential application of the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement’s foregone revenue and inadequate remuneration provisions 
to Reclamation irrigation pricing, and determined that there may be a 
credible legal basis for a WTO member country to allege that 
Reclamation’s irrigation pricing for particular water projects qualifies as 
an actionable subsidy for which countervailing measures may properly 
be imposed against the United States. The WTO member country most 
likely to bring such a challenge against Reclamation in the case of CVP 
irrigation pricing would grow the same crops as the Central Valley 
farms that receive undermarket CVP water; such a country would be 
able to establish the injury necessary to support the imposition of 
countervailing measures under the WTO Subsidies Agreement.151 For 
example, as discussed in this article, Brazil is a producer and exporter of 
cotton along with farms in California’s San Joaquin Valley that rely on 
undermarket CVP water.152 The injury of a WTO member, such as 
Brazil, would presumably be established by demonstrating lost market-
share to crops (e.g., cotton) produced in the United States that are less 
expensive as a result of Reclamation’s undermarket CVP irrigation 
pricing. 
As discussed herein, this article’s mode of analysis for evaluating the 
consistency of Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing with WTO subsidy 
disciplines could also be employed to similarly evaluate WTO 
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compliance for other non-CVP Reclamation water projects in the arid 
west, such as the Rio Grande Project, the Salt River Project, the Boulder 
Canyon Project, the Newlands Project and the Parker-Davis Project. For 
these other Reclamation projects, the pertinent information for such an 
evaluation would be the pricing of the Reclamation project irrigation 
supply contracts, the shortfall between the pricing under these contracts 
and actual Reclamation construction and O&M costs for the project, a 
comparison of Reclamation pricing in such contracts with the pertinent 
statewide or regional market prices for water, and whether there is a 
competing WTO member nation whose domestic producers are being 
adversely impacted by the reduced prices of United States producers 
resulting from these particular Reclamation irrigation subsidies. 
It is foreseeable that the United States might respond to such a WTO 
challenge by noting that, under the terms of long-term water delivery 
contracts, Reclamation is contractually obligated to provide irrigation at 
such undermarket prices.153 The United States’ contention here might 
well be correct, but the fact that Reclamation may have opted to enter 
into long-term contracts with farms to provide subsidized water (or that 
the United States Congress enacted laws that sanctioned such 
subsidization) should not immunize such undermarket prices from being 
characterized as an actionable amber light subsidy under the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement. Per WTO rules, an otherwise actionable subsidy 
is not rendered non-actionable merely because it is implemented 
pursuant to lawful contracts between the government and the parties 
receiving the subsidized benefit, or because the subsidy in question was 
authorized or even mandated pursuant to lawful domestic legislation.154 
Although this article has focused on Reclamation irrigation pricing in 
the United States, much of the reasoning and analysis contained herein 
may also be applicable to other WTO member countries that provide 
undermarket water to domestic farms. Permitting recourse to WTO rules 
and tribunals to address the problem of subsidized irrigation holds the 
prospect not only of addressing fairness considerations between WTO 
trading nations, but also of reducing wasteful irrigation practices, 
shifting production towards less water intensive crops that are more 
compatible with local hydrology, and discontinuing the farming of land 
only marginally suitable for crop production due to poor drainage 
conditions.155 These changes could make additional water available for 
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instream use to sustain fisheries and supplement already strained urban 
water supplies.156 Equity, economic efficiency, and the fisheries sector 
may therefore benefit from a determination that undermarket CVP 
irrigation pricing qualifies as an actionable subsidy under WTO rules. 
In his 1948 book The Thirsty Land: The Story of the Central Valley 
Project, author Robert de Roos argued that California needed the CVP 
to “find ways to use every drop of the available water, to allow none to 
go to waste.”157 Due to Reclamation’s tiered and undermarket pricing 
scheme for CVP irrigation water, however, the CVP’s effects have been 
quite different from what de Roos forecast. By providing farms with 
inexpensive access to extensive quantities of fresh water, Reclamation’s 
CVP has itself led to wasteful irrigation practices, the planting of crops 
inappropriate to the Central Valley’s climate, loss of instream flow to 
sustain native fisheries, and the farming of land with unsuitable 
drainage.158 As a result, there is a growing consensus that much of CVP 
irrigation water is in fact wasted and that this waste comes at the 
expense of urban residents’ water access and prices, local ecosystems, 
and endangered species.159 The same could be said for many other 
Reclamation water projects throughout the United States. 
From a domestic perspective, recourse to WTO subsidy disciplines 
can therefore be understood as a potential means of enlisting 
international trade law to return the CVP specifically, and Reclamation 
more generally, to their original intended purpose of preventing the 
wasteful use of scarce freshwater resources. 
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